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Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the 
Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance
* 
 
This paper offers a new argument for why a more aggressive enforcement of minor offenses 
(‘zero-tolerance’) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more 
severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in which people gain social status 
among their peers for being ‘tough’ by committing criminal acts. As zero-tolerance keeps 
relatively ‘gutless’ people from committing a minor offense, the signaling value of that action 
increases, which makes it attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more 
severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal subcultures, zero-tolerance 
reduces crime across the board. 
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The ‘zero-tolerance’ or ‘broken windows’ approach to crime ﬁghting holds that
a more aggressive enforcement of minor oﬀenses leads to a reduction in both
minor oﬀenses and more severe crime. This approach, ﬁrst articulated by Wil-
son and Kelling (1982), has been pursued in New York City in the nineties
and, since then, in several other US cities including Boston, Chicago, and Los
Angeles. Although the eﬀectiveness of zero-tolerance policies in ﬁghting severe
crime is still open to debate (see for instance Levitt (2004), Weisburd and Eck
(2004), and Harcourt and Ludwig (2006)), a growing body of empirical evidence
indicates that zero-tolerance indeed generates a double dividend. For instance,
using cross-sectional data of US cities, Sampson and Cohen (1988), MacDonald
(2002), and Kubrin et al. (2010) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of police ac-
tivity aimed at disorderly conduct on robbery rates, which can only be partly
attributed to the indirect eﬀect of zero-tolerance on the probability of arrest for
robbery. Braga et al. (1999) conduct a randomized ﬁeld experiment in Jersey
City, New Jersey, and ﬁnd that policing disorder has a negative eﬀect on crime
incidents, with little evidence of displacement to other areas. Corman and Mo-
can (2005) use monthly time-series data between 1974 and 1999 from New York
City and ﬁnd — after controlling for several potentially confounding variables
including police presence and crime-speciﬁc arrests — support for negative ef-
fects of stricter enforcement of minor oﬀenses on more severe crime. Funk and
Kugler (2003) and Vollaard (2006) obtain similar results using Swiss and Dutch
data, respectively.
The prevailing explanation for a double dividend of zero-tolerance relies
on the idea that the ubiquity of disorder and minor crimes signals a general
tolerance towards crime. In the words of former New York City mayor Rudolph
W. Guiliani: “There’s a continuum of disorder. Obviously murder and graﬃti
are two vastly diﬀerent crimes. But they are part of the same continuum, and
a climate that tolerates one is more likely to tolerate the other.”1 One version
1See the Archives of Rudolph W. Giuliani, Major Addresses, "The Next Phase
1of this idea is that prevalence of minor crime signals a lax enforcement of crime
more generally. The recent evidence in Lochner (2007) is not supportive of this
signaling argument. Using longitudinal survey data for the US, he ﬁnds that
young males’ beliefs about the probability of arrest for various crimes are not
aﬀected by local neighborhood conditions like general lawlessness and disarray.
A slightly diﬀerent version of this idea stresses the role of community-norms
in criminal behavior (Ferrer (2010)). Kahan (1997) argues that the persistence
of disorders and other minor crimes shows that the community is unwilling or
unable to exert social sanctions and that crime is accepted as a social norm.
This debate is still wide-open (e.g. Sampson and Raudenbush (2004), Rosado
(2008)), but there is some evidence that casts doubt on the social-norm-signaling
explanation of broken windows. Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) use data from re-
location programs, and show that people who are randomly moved to better
socio-economic neighborhoods (with diﬀerent social norms) do not commit sig-
niﬁcantly less crime.
In this paper, we oﬀer a new argument for a double dividend of zero-tolerance
policies that holds even if public tolerance of crime is common knowledge. We
argue that the incidence of minor and severe crimes is linked, not because it
communicates hidden information about arrest rates or community attitudes,
but because minor and severe crimes are interdependent strategies to attain
status. To this end, we develop a model in which criminal behavior is, at
least partly, motivated by social status concerns. In particular, we assume that
individuals in criminal subcultures care about their status for being ‘tough.’
Individuals diﬀer in innate toughness, which may reﬂect diﬀerences in nerve,
physical ﬁtness, or sensitivity to guilt. Tougher individuals have an absolute
advantage in crime as well as a comparative advantage in more severe crime.
Importantly, innate toughness is not observable, and so individuals make infer-
ences about an individual’s toughness from his actions. We show that, if social
status is suﬃciently important in criminal subcultures, there is a double divi-
of Quality of Life: Creating a More Civil City," Wednesday, February 24, 1998.
http://www.nyc.gov/html/rwg/html/98a/quality.html
2dend of zero-tolerance in that it reduces both minor oﬀenses and more severe
crime.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When minor oﬀenses are pun-
ished harder, some individuals are deterred from committing those acts, and
instead choose not to take action. Since these individuals are relatively ‘gut-
less’ individuals, the signaling value of committing a minor oﬀense increases.
This makes committing a minor oﬀense attractive for some people who would
otherwise commit more severe crime. If people in criminal subcultures care
suﬃciently about status, this eﬀect dominates the standard positive substitu-
tion eﬀect of zero-tolerance on more severe crime (Stigler 1970), and so stiﬀer
penalties for minor oﬀenses reduce crime across the board.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some stylized
facts on status concerns and social norms in criminal subcultures and describes
how the paper relates to the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section
4 characterizes the equilibrium, Section 5 analyzes the eﬀects of zero-tolerance,
and Section 6 investigates the eﬀects of penalizing severe crime. Section 7
concludes.
2 Some stylized facts and related literature
Recent studies in criminology, law, and economics have emphasized the role
of social status and social norms in criminal behavior. Most of these studies
consider negative stigma-eﬀects of committing crime, and argue that stigma,
in addition to imprisonment and ﬁnes, can be an important deterrent of crim-
inal activity (e.g. Rasmusen (1996), Posner (2000), Bar-Gill and Harel (2001),
Blume (2004), Funk (2004), and Arbak (2005)). While social norms that con-
demn criminal behavior are adhered to by a large part of the population, they
are not universally shared. Indeed, in some subcultures, criminals are actu-
ally gloriﬁed. Meares, Katyal, and Kahan (2004) note that criminals “develop
subnorms that may be antiethical to those of the law-abiding world. [...] The
3subnorms of this group reward the criminal activity that the law-abiding world
punishes, and devalues the lawful alternatives that the law-abiding world cele-
brates.” (pp. 1184-1185).
Street cultures are a case in point. Anderson (1999)’s ethnographic study
Code of the Street on violence in Philadelphia’s poor inner-city neighborhoods
ﬁnds that residents are confronted with a “local hierarchy based on toughness”
in which a reputation for being willing and able to ﬁght earns respect among
peers (p. 67). Based on interviews with 191 uncaught violent street oﬀenders
in St. Louis, Missouri, Topalli (2005) concludes that these oﬀenders “operate
in an environment in which oppositional norms catering to ethics of violence,
toughness and respect dominate the social landscape” and that they “strive to
protect a self-image consistent with a code of the streets orientation rather than
a conventional one” (p. 797). Wilkinson (2001), in her study of violence in New
York City, states that: ““toughness” has persistently been highly regarded, a
source of considerable status among adolescents in a wide range of adolescent
subcultures from street corner groups to gangs. [...] Violence often is used to
perpetuate and reﬁne the pursuit of “toughness,” and to claim the identity of
being among the toughest. [...] The status and reputations earned through
violent means provide inner city adolescent males with positive feelings of self
worth and “large” identities especially when other opportunities for identity
development are not available.” (pp. 231-233).2 Lastly, Matsueda et al. (2006a)
test a rational choice model of theft and violence using data from the Denver
Youth Survey. They ﬁnd that “youth who expect to be seen as cool (and value
being seen as cool) if they commit theft or violence tend to commit substantially
more acts of theft and violence, on average, in the coming year.” (p. 115).
Matsueda et al. (2006b) obtain similar results using survey data from Seattle
neighborhoods.
Our analysis is closely related to studies of social status, in particular to
2See also Fagan and Wilkinson (1998). Similar ﬁndings are reported by Hughes and Short
(2005) studying street gangs in Chicago and by King (2001) discussing studies on violence
among football fans in European countries.
4Bernheim (1994) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006). In Bernheim (1994), indi-
viduals conform to a standard of behavior so as to avoid being seen as having
extreme preferences, which would reduce their status or popularity. In Bénabou
and Tirole (2006), there is no such desire to resemble the mainstream. Instead,
individuals want to signal their altruism and aim to appear as altruistic as pos-
sible. Likewise, in this paper, individuals who appear more ‘tough’ earn more
respect from their peers. We share with these papers the focus on how external
incentives may interfere with the desire to signal one’s personality traits.
The idea that people may engage in costly signaling so as to gain esteem
or acceptance by peers is also prominent in Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005).
They develop a model in which individuals signal their social compatibility
by underinvesting in education.3 Silverman (2004) studies a matching game
with two-sided reputation in which some people directly beneﬁt from violence,
whereas others may participate in violence to acquire a ‘street reputation,’ which
provides protection from future assault. One of his main results is that varying
levels of participation in violence may be sustained by the same economic and
social fundamentals. Further, he argues that the eﬀects of enforcement policy
may depend on how policy aﬀects the visibility of a criminal action to peers, as
visibility aﬀects the reputational gain from crime.
Finally, our model is related to the broader literature in economics that
links crimes with social norms and peer eﬀects (see Van der Weele (2010) for an
overview). These papers often consider rather reduced form models to represent
social interactions. For example, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996)
and Patacchini and Zenou (2011) study models in which individuals want to
minimize the social distance between their crime level and that of their refer-
ence group. These studies investigate the level of crime that arises from such
interactions, and can be interpreted as a social norm of crime. Our study does
not investigate the endogenous formation of norms, but simply assumes the
3Our study also relates to papers in which education signals ability, in particular to Bedard
(2001) who argues that greater university access may reduce the signaling value of high school,
and so may increase high school dropout rates.
5existence of a norm which places a value on being known as ‘tough’. Given this
norm, we consider a more speciﬁc mechanism for social interactions, based on
signaling. This allows for a more complex analysis that includes spillover eﬀects
between diﬀerent kinds of crime.
3 The model
Individuals choose between three possible actions denoted by  ∈ {0},
where  =0represents abstaining from crime,  =  represents committing a
minor crime, and  =  represents committing a severe crime. Apart from social
status gains or losses, an individual who commits crime suﬀers an expected net
utility loss of . This expected net utility loss, which can be negative for some
individuals, reﬂects among others the expected pecuniary gain or loss from
crime, the risk of being arrested and punished, the risk of injury or death, and
anticipated feelings of fear and guilt.
Individuals diﬀer in innate ‘toughness’  (a composite of nerve, physical
ﬁtness, insensitivity to guilt, and so on) and so expect a diﬀerent net utility
loss from committing a criminal act. Tougher individuals have higher  and
face lower net cost of committing a crime: 0
()  0 for  =  and  = .
Besides an absolute advantage in both forms of crime, tougher individuals also
have a comparative advantage in severe crime: 0
()  0
(). We assume that
 is distributed according to a cdf (), with lower bound , upper bound ,
and density ().M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, we assume that
Assumption 1 The density () is non-increasing everywhere.
This assumption says that there are relatively few tough types, which we
take to be realistic. As we explain below, this assumption is necessary for some
of our results. Moreover, as we show in the appendix, it guarantees stability of
the equilibrium and uniqueness of the equilibrium thresholds.4
4In both instances this assumption is suﬃcient, but not necessary. That is, () can be
6Individuals care about their social status for being tough. That is, an in-
dividual cares about other people’s belief about his . People cannot observe
each other’s type, but they know the distribution of . They observe each
other’s actions, and update beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.5 The posterior
belief about an individual’s  is denoted by b . Since there are three possible
actions (0), an individual’s b  can take three values, which we denote by b 0,
b ,a n db . Following Bénabou and Tirole (2006), we assume that an individ-
ual’s utility from social status depends linearly on the posterior belief about his
type. Thus, the utility from social status is given by (b ),w i t h0(b )  0 and
00(b )=0 . By the latter assumption, 0(b ) is a constant and can be described
as the weight on social status in the utility function.
4 Equilibrium
Throughout, we focus on a partially-separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
where some individuals abstain from crime, some commit a minor crime, and
some commit a severe crime. Without loss of generality, we assume that if an
individual is indiﬀerent between actions, then he chooses the least severe crime.
All proofs are in the appendix.
Let us ﬁrst consider what happens when individuals do not care about their
social status for being tough. Clearly, all individuals who expect a net utility
loss from committing crime (() ≥ 0 for  =  and  = ) abstain from crime.
Individuals who expect a net utility gain from minor crime (()  0)w h i c hi s
larger than or equal to the expected net utility gain from severe crime (() ≤
()) commit a minor crime. Lastly, individuals expecting a net utility gain
from severe crime (()  0) which is larger than the expected net utility
gain from minor crime (()  ()) commit a severe crime. Clearly, given
increasing on parts of the domain, as long as it does not increase ‘too steeply’ (which threatens
equilibrium stability) or on a range that is ‘too large’ (which would invalidate Proposition 2).
5Silverman (2004) discusses evidence showing that a majority of violent crimes is commit-
ted in public. Also, many of the studies discussed in Section 2 stress the presence of peers
when committing crime.
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Figure 1: Crime in the absence of status concerns
that  is suﬃciently low and  is suﬃciently high, the assumption of absolute
advantage (0
()  0) implies that some people choose to abstain from crime
whereas others choose to commit crime. If there exists a ˜  such that (e )=
(e ) ≤ 0, then the assumption of comparative advantage (0
()  0
())
implies that among those who prefer crime some choose minor crime while others
choose severe crime. Such a situation is depicted in Figure 1, where 0 denotes
the toughness of individuals at the margin between abstaining from crime and
committing a minor crime and  denotes the toughness of individuals at the
margin between minor and severe crime.6 Since tougher individuals have an
6Notice that if (e )=(e )  0, then all individuals who prefer committing a crime to
abstaining from crime choose severe crime, and so nobody commits minor crime. Clearly, if
8absolute advantage in crime as well as a comparative advantage in severe crime
(0
()  0
()  0), the toughest individuals will commit severe crime while
the least tough individuals will abstain from crime. A group in the middle will
commit minor crime.
Crime in equilibrium when individuals care about their social status for
being tough is described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium where each action  ∈ {0} is chosen by
a strictly positive number of people, individuals committing severe crime enjoy
highest status and individuals committing minor crime enjoy higher status than
individuals who abstain from crime. Such an equilibrium exists if  ≤ 0 
   where 0 and  are implicitly and uniquely deﬁned by:
−(0)+(b 0)=(b )
−()+(b )=−()+(b )















Clearly, when crime is also motivated by a concern to signal one’s toughness,
some individuals who would otherwise abstain from crime commit minor crime.
Even though, apart from status concerns, minor crime yields an expected net
utility loss to these individuals, this is compensated by a gain in social status.
Likewise, some individuals who would otherwise commit minor crime, choose
severe crime instead so as to increase their social status. Social status concerns
the expected penalty for severe crime is suﬃciently high compared to the expected penalty for
minor crime, then (e )=(e ) ≤ 0. This can also be seen from Figure 1 by noticing that
an increase in the expected penalty for severe crime shifts the ()-curve upwards. Likewise,
an increase in the expected penalty for minor crime shifts the ()-curve upwards.
9thus induce more people to commit crime. Moreover, among those who commit
crime, more people commit severe crime than when social status plays no role.
5 Double dividend of zero-tolerance
This section examines the eﬀects of a more aggressive enforcement of minor
crime (zero-tolerance) on minor and severe crime. Zero-tolerance may take the
form of an increase in the probability of punishment for minor crime or an
increase in the punishment for minor crime itself. Recall that the expected
net utility loss from crime, (), includes the risk and severity of punishment.
Hence, zero-tolerance can be represented by an increase in () for all .
Clearly, in the absence of status concerns, this gives rise to two eﬀects. First,
it induces some individuals to abstain from crime rather than to commit minor
crime. Second, it gives rise to a substitution between types of crime as in Stigler
(1970): some individuals choose severe crime rather than minor crime.7 Hence,
in the absence of status concerns, zero-tolerance decreases minor crime and
increases severe crime. Because of social status concerns, the last eﬀect may be
reversed, and so zero-tolerance may yield a double dividend. This is shown in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Zero-tolerance of minor crimes
1. always decreases the number of people committing minor crime,








7This can also be seen from Figure 1 by noting that a stiﬀer penalty for minor crime
shifts the ()-curve upwards and hence increases 0 and decreases , implying a decrease
in the number of people committing minor crime and an increase in the number of people
committing severe crime.
10that is, if the weight on social status in the utility function is suﬃciently
high.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 relies on the interplay between the pol-
icy and status in equilibrium. Given people’s beliefs (b 0, b ,a n db ) , zero-
tolerance induces some people to abstain from crime rather than to commit
minor crime. Since these individuals are relatively ‘gutless’ individuals (that
is, have relatively low toughness), the social status gained through committing
minor crime increases. This makes minor crime more attractive for individuals
at the margin between minor and severe crime, and so gives them an incentive
to choose minor crime. Severe crime decreases if this extra status from minor
crime outweighs the extra costs imposed by zero-tolerance for individuals at the
margin between minor and severe crime. The condition for this to happen is
that people in criminal subcultures must care enough about social status (0(b )
should be suﬃciently high). Moreover, the deterrent eﬀect of zero-tolerance at
the lower ends of the toughness distribution must be suﬃciently large, which
happens if costs decreases slowly with type (−0
(0)  0 is low) and the status
of inaction increases enough when the threshold 0 rises (
 0
0 is high). The
reason is that if more individuals at the margin between inaction and minor
crime switch to inaction, then the increase in the signaling value of minor crime
in response to zero-tolerance is larger.
With respect to the fraction of people committing minor crime, conﬂicting
forces are at work. Some gutless individuals will be deterred from minor crime,
whereas some tough individuals may now be attracted to it. The proposition
shows that the former eﬀect outweighs the latter, and minor crime decreases.
Note that this result relies on Assumption 1 that () is non-increasing. The
intuition is that if there are relatively few tough types, a small change in the
threshold  has a large eﬀect on the relative status of minor and severe crimes.
Thus, a relatively small number of people switching from severe to minor crime
11will restore equilibrium. This amount will not oﬀset the number of gutless
people switching from minor crime to no crime.
Hence, if the condition in Proposition 2 is satisﬁed, zero-tolerance leads to a
double dividend and reduces both the number of individuals committing severe
crime and the number of people committing minor crime.
6 Fighting severe crime
This section studies the eﬀects of stiﬀer penalties for severe crime.
Proposition 3 An increase in the penalty for severe crimes
1. always increases minor crime,
2. always decreases severe crime,
3. always increases the total number of people committing crime.
Proof: See Appendix.
By now, the reader will probably ﬁnd the intuition for these results straight-
forward. Through a standard substitution eﬀect, stiﬀer penalties for severe
crime induce some individuals at the margin between severe and minor crime
to commit minor rather than severe crime. Since these individuals are relatively
tough, this raises status when committing a minor crime compared to status
when being passive, and thus induces individuals at the margin between minor
crime and inaction to commit minor crime. It follows from Proposition 3 that if
minor crime is suﬃciently costly to society, the total cost of crime may actually
increase as a result of higher penalties on severe crime. Moreover, if deterrence
of minor crimes yields a double dividend, this policy may deliver more ‘bang
for the buck’ than deterrence of severe crime.
127 Concluding remarks
We have studied the eﬀects of law enforcement when crime is, at least partly,
motivated by social status concerns. We have shown that, when status concerns
are suﬃciently important, zero-tolerance may yield a double dividend in that
it reduces both minor crime as well as more severe crime. The intuition behind
this result is that, by deterring some relatively gutless people, being tough on
minor crime makes minor crime a tougher act, and so it becomes more attractive
for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. Obviously, an
alternative way to reduce crime across the board is to increase the penalties for
both minor and severe crime. It is straightforward to verify that, in our model,
such a policy can simultaneously reduce minor and severe crime. However,
increasing penalties across the board may not always be optimal or feasible.
One reason is that zero-tolerance policies may be less costly than e.g. longer
terms of imprisonment for severe crime (Kahan (1997)). Another reason is that
some forms of punishment may be considered immoral, which puts a limit on
the harshness of punishment of severe crimes.
We have restricted the analysis by assuming that individuals can only take
one of three actions: abstaining from crime, committing a minor crime, and
committing a severe crime. While this is clearly a restrictive assumption, the
resulting status hierarchy consisting of three broad groups is well in line with
the ﬁndings in Fagan and Wilkinson (1998)’s empirical study of violent events
in New York City. Based on narrative reconstructions of violent events reported
by 125 young men, they ﬁnd a hierarchy of social identities consisting of three
broad types with ‘wild’ individuals (who have performed extraordinary acts
of violence) at the top, ‘cool’ individuals (who do what it takes in ‘heated’
situations) in the middle, and ‘herbs’ (who cannot ﬁght or do not prove their
toughness) at the bottom of the status hierarchy. Clearly, extending the model
to allow for a richer, continuous action space will result in a larger number social
identities arising in equilibrium. We speculate that such a model would feature
a perfectly separating equilibrium, with (depending on the size of the action
13space) pooling of the toughest individuals on the highest level of crime. We
believe that our insights would remain true in such a model. That is, increasing
punishment for a particular range of crimes may reduce the incidence of crimes
of higher levels, and will increase crimes at the level below that range.
I nl i n ew i t ht h ee v i d e n c ec i t e di nS e c t i o n2 ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a ti n d i v i d u -
als care directly about status. It is easy to think of alternative interpretations,
though, where status is a means to obtain e.g. protection, attention, or sex.
Anderson (1999), Bandiera (2003), and Silverman (2004) stress the importance
of acquiring a reputation for being tough so as to protect oneself or others
against future attacks. Dnes and Garoupa (2010) argue that violent acts by
youngsters are investments in social status necessary to be recruited by gang
leaders. Relatedly, in Poutvaara and Priks (2009)’s model of hooligan groups,
some of the members ﬁght so as to retain the social beneﬁts from being part
of the group. Wilkinson (2001) ﬁnds in her sample of young men in New York
City that “criminals and those who exhibit tough qualities and behavior are the
“populars” and get the most attention from others.” (p. 241). Drawing on liter-
ature from evolutionary psychology and biology, Rebellon and Manasse (2004)
argue that criminal behavior by males may signal positive adaptive qualities
like nerve and bravery and so may attract females. Using US panel data, they
ﬁnd some evidence for a causal eﬀect of delinquency on romantic involvement
(see also Palmer and Tilley (1995)).
Critical for our results is the assumption that people in criminal subcultures
care about their social status for being ‘tough.’ In Section 2, we discussed sev-
eral studies stressing the relevance of status hierarchies based on toughness and
t h ep r e v a l e n c eo fa n t i - e t h i c a ln o r m si naw i d er a n g eo fs u b c u l t u r e s .A ni m p o r -
tant question that we did not deal with in this paper is how such norms and
subcultures come into being and evolve over time? Empirical studies suggest
that a lack of alternative opportunities for identity development may be respon-
sible (e.g. Wilkinson (2001)). Work along the lines of Oxoby (2004) may shed
more light on this important issue as well as on the implications for optimal
enforcement policies of endogenous formation of subcultures and norms.
14Finally, if our assumptions are not valid, the policy implications highlighted
in this paper may not hold. For example, Poutvaara and Priks (2011) model the
distinction between minor and severe crime in the context of a gang structure,
in which the gang leader sets the optimal crime levels for the gang members. In
their model, penalties for minor crime will never decrease severe crime, but may
increase it. O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010) show that a reputation for toughness
may not be a valuable asset in all circumstances. They argue that blacks are
more likely to be murdered because they are perceived as more violent. This
inspires fear, which raises the possibility of escalation of conﬂicts and the use
of preemptive violence against blacks.
15Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the posterior beliefs (b 0, b , b ), individual
 prefers  =  to  =0if:
−()+(b )  (b 0) (A1)
From 0
()  0 (absolute advantage), it follows that if individual  prefers
action  =  to action  =0 , then all individuals with  ≥  prefer action
 =  to action  =0 , and vice versa. Denote by 0 the value of  for which
(A1) holds with equality. Clearly, in an equilibrium where some people abstain
f r o mc r i m ei tm u s th o l dt h a t0 ≥ .
Given the posterior beliefs (b 0, b , b ), individual  prefers  =  to  = 
if:
−()+(b ) ≥− ()+(b ) (A2)
From 0
()  0
() (comparative advantage), it follows that if individual 
prefers action  =  to action  = , then all individuals with  ≤  prefer
action  =  to action  = , and vice versa. Denote by  the value of  for
which (A2) holds with equality. Clearly, in an equilibrium where some people
choose to commit severe crime it must hold that   .
From (A1) and (A2) and our assumptions on absolute and comparative
advantage, it follows that an equilibrium where some people choose to commit
minor crime must have 0  .















In such an equilibrium, it follows from 0(b )  0 that (b 0)  (b )  (b )
and status increases with the severity of the crime.
16Following the deﬁnition above, 0 and  are given by:
−(0)+(b )=(b 0)
−()+(b )=−()+(b )
Thus, if the solutions to these equations for 0 and  satisfy  ≤ 0 
  , then an equilibrium exists in which each action  ∈ {0} is chosen
by a strictly positive number of people.
Finally, to guarantee the uniqueness of the thresholds 0 and  and the
stability of the equilibrium, we need to do some extra work. We deﬁne
0 (0) ≡ (b (0)) − (b 0(0)) and
(0) ≡ (b ()) − (b (0))
which represent the gain in status for threshold types 0 and  respectively
from switching to a higher level of crime.
It is easy to show that if 0 or  decrease faster than the costs of crime, one
can obtain multiple equilibrium thresholds. Some of these are unstable equilib-
ria in which a) the threshold types are indiﬀerent between diﬀerent crime levels
but b) the slightest ‘tremble’ in the threshold level will cause the equilibrium to
unravel. Let 00 (0) ≡
0(0)
0 and similarly  (0) ≡
(0)
 .
The following conditions rule out these equilibria and assure that the threshold
levels 0 and  are unique

0
(0)  00 (0) ∀0 s.t. 0   and (A4)

0
 () − 
0
 ()   (0) ∀0 s.t. 0   (A5)
In general, the shape of the functions 0 and  will depend on shape of the
density . Jewitt (2004) (see also Bénabou and Tirole 2006: proposition 6.1 on
page 1667) shows that if the density () is weakly decreasing everywhere, then
0 and  are weakly increasing. Thus, a weakly decreasing () is a suﬃcient
17(although not necessary) condition for equations (A4) and (A5) to hold.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .We consider the eﬀects of increasing the expected
net utility loss from minor crime by  for all types. The equilibrium values of
0 and  become:
−(0) −  + (b )=(b 0)
−() −  + (b )=−()+(b )
where b 0, b ,a n db  are functions of 0 and  as described by (A3). Applying










() −  (0)][0













() −  (0)][0























[ − b ] (A10)
First, the sign of the change in the fraction of people committing severe crime
is given by the sign of (A7). By (A4) and (A5) we know that the denominator
18of (A7) is positive. The numerator is positive if:

0













which is identical to the condition in Proposition 2.









Substituting (A6) and (A7), and using conditions (A4) and (A5) it is easy to










Substituting (A9) and (A10) into (A12) and using 0(b 0)=0(b )= we ﬁnd






I ti si m m e d i a t et h a tt h i si ss a t i s ﬁed if the density is non-increasing everywhere.
¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Consider the eﬀect of increasing the individual’s
cost of committing a severe crime by  for all types. Thus, the implicit functions
19for the equilibrium values of 0 and  become:
−(0)+(b )=(b 0)
−()+(b )=−() −  + (b )
where b 0, b ,a n db  are functions of 0 and  given by (A3). Totally diﬀer-








() −  (0)][0









(0) − 00 (0)]
[0
() − 0
() −  (0)][0





where we used (A4) and (A5) to establish the signs of these expressions. The
proof of part 3 follows directly from (A14). ¤
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